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ABSTRACT 
During the late 90s, NASA retrofitted the Space Shuttle fleet with a “glass 
cockpit.”  The new displays replicated legacy formats developed in the 70s, and 
did not leverage 20 years of display technology and human factors advances. To 
address this shortcoming the Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (CAU) was initiated to 
reduce mental workload (MW), increase situational awareness (SA), and 
enhance performance. Despite the CAU demonstrating improvements in MW, 
SA, and performance, it was cancelled. Consequently, recorded astronaut data 
from using the baseline and CAU cockpit configurations was never tied back to 
cockpit design. This study assesses the CAU design employing human factors 
principles, evaluates baseline and CAU simulation data, and traces MW and SA 
differences back to CAU design modifications. Significant improvements were 
found in all measures and across all conditions. These improvements were found 
to be greater for ascent scenarios than for entry.  From the findings, 
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When the Space Shuttle was originally developed in the 1970s, the cockpit was 
based on the latest technology at the time including fly by wire controls and 
computer displays.  As that technology became obsolete, NASA retrofitted the 
Space Shuttle fleet with a modern “glass cockpit.”  At first the new displays 
replicated legacy formats, and did not leverage nearly 30 years of advances in 
display technology and human factors design. To address this shortcoming, the 
Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (CAU) project was initiated to update display formats 
to reduce mental workload (MW), increase situational awareness (SA), and 
enhance performance.  Despite demonstrating improvement in terms of MW, SA, 
and performance over the baseline design, the CAU project was cancelled in 
2004 due to budgetary constraints.  Consequently, astronaut performance data 
using the baseline and CAU configurations was not completely analyzed and tied 
back to the adopted design modifications.  The purpose of this study was to 
critique the CAU design employing human factors principles, evaluate baseline 
and CAU MW and SA data, and trace back specific design modifications that 
contributed to improvements in MW and SA.   
A literature review was conducted to identify how human factors principles 
can be used to effectively organize and present information in a design concept 
for a cockpit.  It included consideration of relevant methods and criteria to 
objectively critique a design concept, including task analysis, display design 
principles, design eye position, and display-control compatibility.  This was 
followed by an examination of the theories and methods used in design 
assessment, including measures of mental workload and situation awareness. 
The information reviewed includes scientific journals, textbooks, NASA 
documents, technical standards, and related prior work. 
Based on the literature review, a process was established to critically 
evaluate a cockpit design change and assessing its effectiveness. The evaluation 
began with a task analysis.  This was followed by a task-oriented evaluation of 
 xvi
the layout of the displays from the operator perspective, the formatting of 
information on each display, the hardware attributes, and the display-control 
relationship. The design critique noted that the changes in the use of color, the 
consolidation of information, and the use of pictorial representations of systems 
are relevant to all crew positions and in all phases of flight.  The critique also 
identified the predictive aiding features of the ascent horizontal situation display 
as the likely cause of the variation between ascent and entry scenarios. 
To assess the effectiveness of the CAU design changes over the baseline 
design, MW and SA data were analyzed. For every MW and SA measure, there 
was a significant improvement favoring the CAU design vs. the baseline for all 
crew positions and in all phases of flight. The analysis also revealed that these 
improvements were significantly greater for ascent operations than for entry.   
It is recommended that future manned spacecraft cockpits incorporate the 
design principles demonstrated in the CAU, including the use of a consistent 
color scheme, task-centric consolidation of information, and the use of pictorial 
representations of complex systems.  It is further suggested that predictive aiding 
displays should be developed wherever possible for use during all dynamic 
phases of flight.  Finally, it is recommended that the evaluation of these future 
systems should include a mechanism for gathering operator feedback on the 
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With the Space Shuttle program ending in 2011, the United States no 
longer possesses the capability to launch astronauts into space. Many follow on 
programs were proposed over the years, but none have been realized to date 
(Frank, 2010).  The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle is currently being 
developed as NASA's next generation manned spacecraft, but it is not expected 
to be operational until at least 2021 (Stanfield, 2012).  This gap will be the 
longest the United States has gone without possessing its own launch capability 
since the 1961 dawn of manned spaceflight.  It is inevitable that manned 
spaceflight will resume in the United States, but until then it is imperative that we 
maintain our technological expertise, and continue to build on the lessons 
learned in past programs. 
When the Space Shuttle was originally developed in the 1970s, the 
cockpit was based on the latest technology available at the time.  The avionics 
suite incorporated technologies such as fly by wire controls and computer 
displays, which were considered quite advanced at the time (McCandless, 2004).  
The two decades that followed saw the development of glass cockpit technology 
in the commercial sector, driven by the ever-increasing complexity of air transport 
operations.  Despite the fact that NASA was very much involved in this effort, the 
Space Shuttle cockpit remained unchanged for this period (Tranthien, 1995).   
While the shuttle's original cockpit equipment was extremely reliable, it 
was nonetheless costly to maintain over time (McCandless, 2004).  In 2000, the 
original electro-mechanical cockpit instrumentation was replaced with the 
Multifunction Electronic Display System (MEDS) glass cockpit (McCandless et 
al., 2005).  The MEDS cockpit upgraded all of the hardware to modern liquid 
crystal displays, but in many areas it retained the legacy layouts of information 




maintenance and supportability issues, it did not resolve any of the legacy human 
factors concerns, and did not fully leverage the advances that had been made in 
glass cockpit technology.  The system still displayed graphics and text in 
monochrome, still required multiple key-presses to read system and subsystem 
information, and still presented information in closely spaced rows of digital 
numbers, making it difficult to locate off-normal values (McCandless et al., 2005). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Shuttle Glass Cockpit (From NASA, 2000) 
To address these remaining shortcomings, the Cockpit Avionics Upgrade 
(CAU) project was then initiated in 1999 (Marchant et al., 2001).  CAU was 
intended to update the display formats shown on the cockpit displays in order to 
reduce mental workload (MW), enhance situational awareness (SA), and 
increase performance, thereby improving overall system safety (McCandless, 
2004).  Based on human factors research, the program produced a design for 
enhanced display formats and keysets.   The new formats were intended to be 
task-oriented and tailored to each phase of flight (McCandless, 2004).   
Despite demonstrating considerable improvement over the baseline 




and no orbiter vehicle ever flew with the enhanced cockpit (McCandless, 2004).  
To evaluate the effectiveness of the CAU, thousands of data points on human 
performance were collected as part of this project, but since the cancellation, 
those data have never been fully analyzed (McCandless, 2004).   
B. PURPOSE 
As part of the CAU evaluation, the data were analyzed only so far as to 
determine that significant improvement did exist in the CAU cockpit in MW and 
SA.  To date a complete analysis has not been completed to assess why 
astronaut performance improved, what design changes contributed to these 
improvements, or what crew activities were most affected.  Furthermore, the 
breadth of data collected allows the opportunity to examine which measures are 
most useful in predicting overall crew performance. Therefore, there are three 
primary objectives of this thesis: 1) complete a thorough assessment of the CAU 
evaluation data in order to gain understanding of why an improvement exists, 2) 
develop design recommendations for future manned space systems, and 3) 
develop recommendations for methods of evaluating astronaut performance in 
these future systems.   
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The CAU project was intended to leverage over 20 years of advances that 
had been made in human factors since the Shuttle was originally designed in the 
1970s.  Despite demonstrating considerable improvements in MW and SA, CAU 
was cancelled in 2004 and the data that were collected during the program was 
never been fully analyzed.  With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, the impetus 
to revisit the data has waned as well. 
It is inevitable that the United States eventually will return to manned 
spaceflight in an American spacecraft.  When this happens, it is essential that 
existing lessons learned in safety, situational awareness, and mental workload all 




been collected in all of these areas.   It is imperative that this data be translated 
into actionable knowledge that can be applied to future manned spacecraft.   
In examining the data for the CAU evaluation study the following research 
questions are proposed: 
1) Did the CAU design changes lead to improvements in crew 
mental workload and/or situation awareness? 
2) If mental workload and/or situation awareness improvements 
exist, do they vary by crew station or phase of flight? 
3) Can crew mental workload and/or situation awareness changes 
be traced back to specific CAU design modifications? 
D. HUMAN SYSTEM INTEGRATION DOMAIN APPLICABILITY  
NASA describes Human System Integration as “an umbrella term for 
several areas of ‘human factors’ research that include human performance, 
technology design, and human-computer interaction” (NASA, 2012).  The 
Department of Defense (DOD) further identifies seven domains of Human 
Systems Integration: human factors engineering (HFE), personnel, habitability, 
manpower, training, safety and occupational health, and survivability (DOD, 
2008).  This thesis relates to HFE, training, and system safety domains. 
HFE is defined as “the comprehensive integration of human 
characteristics into system definition, design, development, and evaluation to 
optimize the performance of human-machine combinations” (Booher, 2003).  
This study involves the application of HFE principles in evaluating a set of display 
designs of the Space Shuttle.   The lessons learned from this evaluation can be 
applied to future activities in the HFE domain. 
Training is defined as the “the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities 
needed by the available personnel to operate and maintain systems under 




this study alter the task requirements, and therefore affect the knowledge and 
skills required to operate the system.  Consequently, the training domain is 
affected. 
System Safety is defined as “the inherent ability of the system to be used, 
operated, and maintained without accidental injury to personnel” (Booher, 2003).  
The primary objective of the CAU program was to improve overall system safety 
by improving the quality of the human-computer interface (McCandless, 2004).  
Therefore, this evaluation of the CAU program relates to the system safety 
domain. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  Chapter I provides an overview 
of the Space Shuttle Cockpit Avionics Upgrade program, including rationale and 
objectives.  Chapter II provides a review of scientific and technical literature 
regarding Space Shuttle systems, cockpit evaluation, and flight crew 
performance assessment.  Chapter III describes the methods by which the CAU 
modifications were evaluated.  Chapter IV presents the results of the evaluation.  









II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The intent of this chapter is to provide the context necessary for 
understanding and evaluating the Shuttle CAU program.  It begins with a 
historical and technical review of shuttle cockpit avionics systems.  Next there is 
a review of relevant methods and criteria by which the design upgrades can be 
objectively critiqued.  Finally, there is a review of the theories and methods by 
which the effectiveness of the upgrades can be assessed experimentally.  The 
information reviewed includes scientific journals, textbooks, NASA documents, 
technical standards, and related prior work. 
The literature review process began with a review of prior work in the CAU 
program.  This included materials obtained directly from the NASA Ames 
Research Center, as well as those that were found by searching Google Scholar 
for the terms “Shuttle” and “CAU.”  To provide the necessary conceptual 
foundations, the search was extended to include such topics as mental workload, 
situation awareness, and information processing.  Additional electronic resources 
searched included The Naval Postgraduate School Library, Defense Technical 
Information Center, and NASA Technical Report Server.  Available textbooks 
were also reviewed for these topics.  To gain a practical perspective on cockpit 
evaluation methods, additional resources were obtained from the U.S. Naval Test 
Pilot School.   
B. SHUTTLE COCKPIT SYSTEMS 
The Space Shuttle was one of the first major applications of fly-by-wire 
control technology (Marchant et al., 2001). The onboard Data Processing System 
(DPS) controls almost all shuttle operations from ascent to landing, including 




(GNC).  Most tasks during ascent and entry are fully automated, with the crew 
monitoring for various takeover criteria (NASA, 2002).   
 At the heart of the DPS system were five IBM APC-101S general purpose 
computers (GPCs) (NASA, 2002).  Four of these GPCs ran the shuttle's Primary 
Avionics System Software (PASS), while the fifth ran the Backup Flight System 
(BFS).  PASS was designed to manage all shuttle operations from launch to 
landing.  BFS was much simpler, intended to provide only the capabilities needed 
to safely launch and recover the shuttle.  Each software suite was developed 
separately to minimize the possibility that a programming defect in one would 
affect the other (NASA, 2002). Both software suites performed critical functions, 
and crewmembers often were required to utilize both of them throughout normal 
flight operations (Holland & Vanderark, 1993; NASA, 2002). 
DPS software was divided by phase of flight into Operational Sequences 
(OPS), and further subdivided into major modes (see Figure 2). Transitions 
between OPS were initiated by the crew, but transitions between MMs could be 
done automatically (NASA, 2002).  Each MM included an associated display 
page that presented the crew with information concerning that portion of the 






Figure 2.   Shuttle Flight Computer Software (NASA, 2002) 
In order to discuss the shuttle's glass cockpit in context, it is helpful to 
begin by reviewing the layout of the original electro-mechanical cockpit (see 
Figure 3).  In this legacy arrangement, electrically driven mechanical displays 
were provided for monitoring flight performance and critical systems (Tranthien, 
1995).  This included an Attitude Director Indicator (ADI), Horizontal Situation 
Indicator (HSI), Alpha/Mach Indicator (AMI), Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator 
(AVVI), and various moving-tape instruments for monitoring critical systems such 
as Main Propulsion (MPS), Orbital Maneuvering (OMS), and the Auxiliary Power 




(CRT) displays and two corresponding keypads were provided to interface with 
the DPS.  Display pages unique to each MM were presented on these three 
displays.  Due to the degree of computer control aboard the shuttle, the bulk of 
operating parameters were monitored by the crew solely through this DPS 
interface (Marchant et al., 2001).  Each CRT Display/ Keyboard pair could be 
switched to connect to any of the five GPCs (NASA, 2002).   
 
Figure 3.   Legacy Electromechanical Cockpit Layout (From Tranthien, 1995) 
The original (MEDS) glass cockpit upgrade had nine identical Multifunction 
Display Units (MDUs) installed in the forward panel of the shuttle cockpit (see 
Figure 4) (NASA, 2002). Two MDUs were installed directly in front of the 
commander and pilot stations, respectively labeled CDR1, CDR2, PLT1, and 
PLT2.  The remaining five MDUs, labeled MFD1, MFD2, CRT1, CRT2, and 







Figure 4.   MEDS Cockpit Display Layout (From NASA, 2002) 
The nine displays are driven by four onboard Integrated Display 
Processors (IDPs), which receive information from five data busses and four 
analog-to-digital converters (NASA, 2002).  This information is processed for 
display and sent to the MDUs via a 1553B data bus (see Figure 5).  The CDR, 
PLT, and MFD displays are each connected to a primary and secondary IDP.  
The CRT displays are each only connected to a single IDP.  The system is 
configured to ensure that at least one CDR, one PLT, and one CRT display 
remain available in the event of a dual IDP failure.  The five GPCs, along with the 
PASS and BFS software, were not affected by the glass cockpit installation 
(Tranthien, 1995; NASA, 2002). 
 
 




The Shuttle Crew Operating Manual (SCOM) divides the set of available 
display formats in the baseline MEDS configuration into flight, subsystem, and 
DPS formats (NASA, 2002).  Flight formats display graphical representations of 
the legacy electromechanical flight instruments (ADI, HSI, AMI, AVVI, etc.). 
Subsystem displays include APU/HYD and MPS/OMS subsystem vertical tapes, 
as well as the Surface Position Indicator (SPI). The DPS display formats (which 
varied according to the current MM) were carried over directly from the legacy 
CRT display formats.  In general, the CDR and PLT MDUs are used to show the 
flight instruments, the MFD MDUs are used to show the subsystem displays and 
the CRT MDUs are used to show DPS displays (see Figure 6).   
 
Figure 6.   Typical Baseline Ascent Display Configuration (From NASA, 2002)  
The CAU called for minimal hardware upgrades, however the display 
formats, however, differed greatly from the baseline MEDS (Hayashi et al., 
2005).  CAU formats were divided into Flight, System, and Fault categories 
(Patrick & Mastracchio, 2002).  The Flight category included primary flight display 
(PFD), trajectory (TRAJ), and horizontal situation (H-SIT) formats, each tailored 
to the current MM.  The System category included specific pages for ECLSS, 
DPS, Navigation, Control, RCS, OMS/MPS, APU/Hyd, and EPS subsystems. 
Fault pages provided overall failure annunciation and diagnostic information, and 
were intended to be the focal point for critical systems monitoring (Reisman, 





Figure 7.   Typical CAU Display Configuration for Ascent (From Reisman, 2002) 
C. DESIGN CRITERIA 
The U.S. Naval Test Pilot School Flight Test Manual provides a 
methodology and recommended guidelines for conducting a cockpit evaluation.   
A central element of this evaluation method is a focus on the mission and tasks 
to be performed by the flight crew (Masters et al., 2005).  The list of cockpit 
elements to be evaluated should include the layout of displays and controls as 
seen from the design eye position, the hardware attributes of the various 
components, the formatting of display content, and the interrelationships between 
controls and displays (Masters et al., 2005). To enable a thorough cockpit 
evaluation using this method, it is helpful to review the relevant aspects of task 
analysis, cockpit layout, display formatting, hardware attributes, and the display-
control relationship. 
1. Task Analysis 
Task analysis is defined as the study of the actions and cognitive 
processes required of an operator to achieve a system goal (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 
1992).  There are two complementary task analysis procedures that will be 
employed in this evaluation.  The first is hierarchical task analysis (HTA), which is 
a method used to define an activity by breaking it down into its respective 
components (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992). The second method, task 
decomposition, is a way of expanding the information from the task description 




Ainsworth, 1992).  For this evaluation, the goal of the HTA was to identify the 
display-related crewmember tasks during ascent and entry operations.  The goal 
of the task decomposition was to identify information requirements, challenges, 
and opportunities for error for each identified task.   
Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992) identified several potential means of 
gathering information for a task analysis, including observation, interviews with 
subject matter experts, and examination of documentation.  Potential document 
sources can include operating manuals and emergency procedures (Kirwan & 
Ainsworth, 1992).  Several sources are available for gathering information on 
Space Shuttle flight crew tasks.  Most notably, the SCOM provides an overview 
of all normal procedures for all phases of flight, and the crew pocket checklist 
provides details on contingency and emergency procedures (NASA, 2002).  
Additionally, Holland and Vanderark (1993) used operating manuals, astronaut 
interviews, and observations in a Space Shuttle simulator to conduct a detailed 
task analysis of flight crew activities during entry and landing phases of flight.   
2. Design Eye and Display Placement 
The Design Eye Position is defined in MIL-STD-1333B as the intended 
viewpoint of the average operator (see Figure 8).  It is a reference point from 
which all crew station dimensions are related and referenced (DoD, 1987).  The 
placement of displays within a cockpit is determined with this point in mind.  For 
military systems, this placement is standardized in MIL-STD-1333B and MIL-






Figure 8.   Design Eye Position (From Woodson, 1981) 
The NASA standard provides three relevant guidelines for the placement 
of displays:  (1) The most important and most frequently used displays shall be 
provided privileged positions in the crew's viewing zone in order to ensure quick 
processing and reaction; (2) Displays and controls shall be visible and be within 
the functional reach envelope of the crew under all conditions (e.g., suited, 
seated, restrained, and unrestrained); and (3) Displays and controls shall be 
located and designed so that they may be used to the required degree of 
accuracy by the crew in normal operating positions (NASA, 2011).   
Huchingson (1981) asserted that the most important and frequently used 
instruments should be grouped together within a 30-degree cone of vision 
centered about the primary line of sight. Huchingson further identified a 
maximum visual field for display placement as +/- 35 degrees horizontally, and 
+40/-20 degrees vertically about the primary line of sight.  These limits are based 





Figure 9.   Optimum and Maximum Visual Fields (From Huchingson, 1981) 
3. Display Design 
In order to describe a cockpit design change from a human factors 
perspective, it is helpful to first identify a universal framework that can be used to 
evaluate the quality of a cockpit display.  One such widely accepted framework is 
the thirteen principles of display design (Wickens, Lee, Liu, & Gordon-Becker, 
2004).  This list is organized into four distinct categories: (1) perceptual 
principles, (2) mental model principles, (3) principles based on attention, and (4) 
memory principles.  
a. Perception 
Perceptual principles influence the way an operator initially perceives the 
information being displayed.  These principles emphasize presenting information 
clearly and unambiguously so as to promote timely perception and avoid 
confusion (Wickens et al., 2004).  Perception can be further aided by creating 
context, or by using familiar representations, such as fonts and icons (Wickens & 











Avoid requiring a user to judge more than 5-7 
levels of a single variable (color, size, etc). 
Top-down 
processing 
People interpret signals based on what they 
expect to perceive, and therefore off-normal 
conditions should be emphasized. 
Redundancy gain Correct interpretation is more likely when a 
signal is expressed in more than one place, 
especially when an alternate form is used. 
Use discriminable 
elements 
Two signals that look alike are likely to be 
confused. 
Table 1.   Perceptual Principles (From Wickens et al., 2004) 
b. Mental Models 
Mental model principles relate to the operator's expectations, or "mental 
model" of the system being displayed (Wickens et al., 2004).  Mental models can 
be defined as a mechanism to generate descriptions of system purpose and 
form, explanations of system functioning, and predictions of future system states 
(Rouse & Morris, 1985).  When a display is perceived, operators tend to interpret 
its appearance and movement in terms of this mental model (Wilson & 
Rutherford, 1989).  Mental Model principles are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Principle Considerations 
Principle of pictorial 
realism 
The display should look like the variable that it 
represents. 
Principle of the 
moving part 
Moving elements on a display should match the 
user's mental model of the system being 
represented. 





Attentional principles are important for displays that have multiple 
elements (Wickens et al., 2004).  Three components of attention are needed to 
process these types of displays: (1) selective attention (or attention allocation) for 
choosing the necessary information source, (2) focused attention for avoiding 
distraction from neighboring sources, and (3) divided attention for allowing 
parallel processing from two sources as needed (Wickens et al., 2004).  Attention 
allocation can be either a knowledge drive top-down process, or a bottom-up 
process which is driven by the salience of the cue (Yantis, 1993).  In either case 
it can be inhibited when excessive effort is required to shift attention(Wickens et 
al., 2004).  The attentional principles summarized in Table 3 provide ways to 
capitalize on human strengths or mitigate human weaknesses with respect to 






The amount of effort needed to move between 
required pieces of information (menus on a 





Two related pieces of information that must be 
integrated (such as a graph and its legend) 
should be displayed in close proximity to each 
other.  Close proximity need not be exclusively 
in terms of space.  It can also be achieved by 
using a common color or pattern. 
Principle of multiple 
resources 
Divide information across resources, such as 
visual and auditory, to facilitate concurrent 
processing. 






Memory principles deal with the limited capacities of both long term and 
short term memory (Wickens et al., 2004).  Short term memory is heavily limited 
in the number of “chunks” of information that can be retained at any one time 
(Cowan, 2010).  Long term memory limitations include both forgetting important 
information, as well as persisting in following outdated or incorrect information 
(Wickens et al., 2004).  These principles, presented in Table 4, emphasize 






Do not require that all important information be 
retained solely in working memory or retrieved 
from long term memory. 
Principle of 
predictive aiding 




Displays should be designed in a way that is 
consistent with what the user is already familiar 
with. 
Table 4.   Memory Principles (From Wickens et al., 2004) 
4. Hardware Attributes 
The NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard for Human Factors, 
Habitability, and Environmental Health (NASA-STD-3001 Volume 2) defines a set 
of technical requirements by which a spacecraft’s display hardware can be 
evaluated (see Table 5).  Despite the fact that the Space Shuttle is not a military 
system, MIL STD 1472G can be used for evaluation as well.  MIL-STD-1472 is 
widely regarded as an authoritative source of good human factors design 






Metric Minimum Maximum Notes 
Ambient contrast ratio 10  Includes ambient 
illumination 
Viewing angle -45 deg +45 deg 4-point viewing angle 
(left, right, up, down), 
contrast and color 
gamut criteria met 
Spatial resolution 32 pixels/deg   
Frame rate 60 Hz   
Number of colors 4096   
Table 5.   Required Visual Display Parameters (From NASA, 2011) 
While evaluating against the NASA standard provides a sense of the 
overall quality of a display, an additional level of analysis is needed to determine 
whether or not existing hardware is suitable for displaying the proposed display 
formats.  To this end, NASA conducted a study to evaluate the color and 
luminance properties of the existing MDU hardware (McCandless, 2003).   Using 
a colorimeter and a luminance meter, measurements were taken of each 
required color from crew design eye positions under various lighting conditions.  
Two relevant key findings came from this study: 1) Viewing angle has negligible 
effect on all proposed CAU colors except orange, which can vary in appearance 
from yellow to red depending on angle; and 2) The display can not produce true 
black, but instead appears dark blue when black is commanded.   
5. Display Control 
Fitts and Seeger (1953) identified the importance of the relationship 
between a control and the display for the entity being controlled in the principle of 
stimulus-response compatibility.  Good compatibility, which is associated with 




located in close proximity to the display of the entity being controlled (Wickens et 
al., 2004).  Stimulus-response compatibility is also affected by the coding (i.e., 
verbal vs. spatial) of the control and the associated display (Wickens, Vidulich, & 
Sandry-Garza, 1984).  Design requirements based on these principles are 
articulated in NASA STD 3001; which states that displays and controls shall be 
grouped according to purpose or function, and that the relationship between the 
display and control shall be logical and explicit (NASA, 2011).   
MIL STD 1472 provides additional guidelines for the physical properties of 
display control hardware.  The standard specifies that a physical keyboard shall 
be used for entering any alpha-numeric data, and that positive feedback shall be 
provided on screen during such data-entry tasks (DoD, 2012).  It further requires 
that individual keys in a vehicle-mounted keypad should be no smaller than 0.75 
inches in width, and be separated by 0.5 inches (DoD, 2012).  Finally, the 
standard requires that all keys and pushbuttons (regardless of location) shall 
provide tactile feedback (DoD, 2012).   
D. ASSESSING DESIGN EFFECTIVENESS 
MW and SA are both considered to be important factors in the design of 
aviation systems.  (Selcon, Taylor, & Koritsas, 1991).  Tsang and Vidulich (2006) 
noted that these two concepts are highly interrelated, and are affected by many 
of the same factors.  Cockpit design improvement efforts are often focused on 
these common factors, with an overall objective of reducing mental workload and 
improving SA  (e.g., Carmody-Bubb & Maybury, 1998; Weinstein & Wickens, 
1992)  
Two goals of the CAU program were to reduce workload and enhance 
situation awareness.  Therefore, prior to assessing the effectiveness of the 
program, it is necessary to review these two concepts.  Both MW and SA are 




application.  Measurements are assessed in terms of validity, sensitivity, 
selectivity, diagnosticity, intrusiveness, and reliability (see  Table 6). 
 
Validity The extent to which a dependent measure actually assesses 
what it is intended to measure 
Sensitivity the degree to which a measure distinguishes between 
differing conditions or states 
Selectivity the degree to which a measure is sensitive only to changes in 
the construct of interest 
Diagnosticity the degree to which a measure not only identifies changes but 
identifies the cause of any variation 
Intrusiveness the degree to which a measure interferes with the primary task
Reliability the degree to which a measure is consistent 
Table 6.   Measurement Criteria  (After Marchant et al., 2001;  
Uhlarik & Comerford, 2002) 
1. Mental Workload 
a. Theory and Issues 
The most basic way to express the MW concept is in terms of spare 
capacity.  The simplest and most intuitive way to express spare capacity is in 
terms of the ratio of time required to complete a set of tasks and the time 
available (TR/TA) (Wickens et al., 2004).  While this single dimension can not 
fully capture MW’s complexity and multidimensionality, it has nonetheless been 
shown to be an effective approximation in some situations (Hendy, Liao, & 
Milgram, 1997).  In addition to roughly predicting MW, the TR/TA ratio also 
should predict the point at which excess workload begins to degrade 




person can be said to be in overload. Conversely, when time required is less 
than time available (TR/TA < 1.0) a person can be said to have spare capacity 
(Wickens et al., 2004).  In situations where spare capacity exists, the amount of 
spare capacity can be used as a MW measure (Lysaght et al., 1989; Roscoe & 
Ellis, 1990). 
While time makes for a good approximation in many situations, it is very 
limited as an expression of overall workload. For example, tasks that are very 
practiced can often be carried out with little conscious thought, regardless of how 
much time is required to actually complete them (Logan, 1985).  These kinds of 
issues can be accounted for by viewing workload not in terms of limitations in 
time, but in terms of a limited capacity central processor (Moray, 1967). This view 
is foundational to so-called 'capacity' or 'resource' theories, which postulate that 
limited attentional resources are available for conducting tasks, and that more 
difficult tasks leave fewer resources available for conducting concurrent tasks.  
The available resource supply fluctuates based on the individual's level of 
arousal, and performance degradations occur when resource demands exceed 
resource supply (Kahneman, 1973).   
As a result of studies conducted in the 1970s, evidence emerged that task 
performance could not be attributed to a single resource pool, and that the 
presence of multiple, separate limited resource pools appeared to better account 
for performance (Wickens, 2002a).  The presence of multiple pools related to 
specific abilities is a foundational principle of multiple-resource theory.  Wickens's 
multiple-resource model proposes four dimensions to account for variance in 
multitasking performance: (1) processing stages, (2) perceptual modalities, (3) 
visual channels, and (4) processing codes.  In each dimension, two separate 
pools of resources are postulated to exist.  The dimension of stages refers to 
information processing stages, including perception, cognition, and response.  
Wickens (2002) identified that the resources used for perception and cognition 
appear to be separate and distinct from those resources used for responding.  




modalities.  Wickens identified that the resources used for each of these two 
modalities appears to be separate and distinct.  The dimension of channels 
refers to a distinction between focal and ambient visual processing, that appear 
to use separate resources.  Finally, the dimension of codes refers to the 
distinction between spatial and verbal processing. Wickens found that in any 
cognitive stage, spatial and verbal processes appear to depend on separate 
resources.  Across each of these dimensions, much work has been done 
suggesting that when controls and displays do not all require the same resource 
pool, there is less competition for limited resources, and less overall workload as 
a result (Lysaght et al., 1989).   
b. Measurement 
The techniques commonly used to empirically assess MW include task 
performance measures, physiological measures, and subjective measures 
(Lysaght et al., 1989).  Muckler & Seven (1992) noted that the “distinction 
between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ measurement is neither meaningful nor 
useful in human performance studies.”  Casali and Wierwille (1984) found that 
with highly trained participants (such as aircraft pilots) subjective rating scales 
are highly sensitive instruments for measuring MW.  Therefore, of the three 
methods listed above, subjective measures are of greatest interest to this study.   
Roscoe and Ellis (1990) showed that pilots easily adapt to subjectively 
expressing MW through the concept of spare capacity, and developed the 
Bedford Workload Rating Scale (BWRS) based on this concept.  The BWRS, 
which was adapted from the Cooper Harper rating scale for aircraft handling, 
uses a simple decision tree (see Figure 10) to arrive at a subjective assessment 
of workload on a scale from 1 (Workload insufficient) to 10 (Pilot unable to apply 
sufficient effort).  While easy to use, the authors recognized that there are 
significant drawbacks to this method. One of the most glaring is the fact that it 
requires active subject participation, and therefore cannot be used to measure 
workload during a task without a significant disruption.  Another important 




individualized to each pilot. The BWRS has been extensively used in cockpit 
workload evaluation studies, and is well understood by flight crews (Lysaght et 
al., 1989). It has been found to correlate well with other MW measures, such as 
heart rate, and is most effective when used during or shortly after the flight task 
in question (Roscoe & Ellis, 1990). The BWRS is also somewhat limited in its 
complexity and sensitivity. 
 
Figure 10.   Bedford Workload Rating Scale (From Roscoe & Ellis, 1990) 
Because workload is a multidimensional concept, various researchers 
have argued that subjective ratings should consist of more than just a single 
scale (Wickens et al., 2004).  In developing the NASA Task Load Index (TLX), 
Hart & Staveland (1988) proposed using six dimensions to assess workload: 
mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and 
frustration.  Subjective ratings are then obtained separately for each of these 
dimensions.  Each dimension is weighted according to how much it contributed to 




ratings from each scale.  While TLX provides more dimensionality than BWRS, it 
suffers from some of the same limitations.  It cannot be used to measure 
workload in the middle of a task without disrupting that task, and it requires 
normalization for each participant.  Hart (2006), in reviewing the use of TLX over 
a 20 year period found that it had been referenced in over 500 studies, primarily 
in aviation settings.  A literature review conducted by Cain (2007) indicated that 
TLX performs comparably to other multidimensional workload instruments, and is 
much more sensitive than one-dimensional scales such as the BWRS.   A similar 
review conducted by Lysaght (Lysaght et al., 1989) found TLX to be a valid, 
reliable, and sensitive technique for workload assessment. 
 




2. Situation Awareness 
a. Theory and Issues 
Endsley (1999) defined SA as "the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their 
meaning and the projection of their status in the near future."  This is the most 
frequently cited definition to be found in the scientific literature (Uhlarik & 
Comerford, 2002).  Encapsulated within Endsley’s definition are three distinct 
levels of SA.  Level 1 SA involves perceiving critical elements in the environment.  
Level 2 SA involves understanding these critical elements and relating them to 
the aircrew's goals.  Level 3 SA involves projection these elements into the near 
future and understanding what will happen.  Wickens (2002b) further identified a 
clear distinction between spatial awareness and system awareness, with distinct 
requirements for each type.  Spatial awareness requires knowledge of elements 
such as attitude, heading, velocity, vertical velocity,  aircraft capabilities, and 
projected flight path; whereas System awareness requires awareness of such 
elements as system status, settings, and the impact of system configurations and 
malfunctions on overall system performance and flight safety (Wickens, 2002b)  
As a process, SA is closely linked with perception and working memory, 
and is therefore subject to limits in attentional capacity (Tsang & Vidulich, 2006).  
Consequently, high workload tasks that consume attentional resources can lead 
to poor SA.  Therefore, the way in which a cockpit presents information to the 
operator has a huge impact on crew SA (Tsang & Vidulich, 2006).  Presenting 
too much information at one time can lead to excessive workload, which can be 
as much of a hindrance to good SA as presenting too little information (Uhlarik & 
Comerford, 2002).  In general, Endsley (1999) notes, "The more complex the 
systems are to operate, the greater the increase the mental workload required to 






In their review of the scientific literature pertaining to MW measurement, 
Uhlarik & Comerford (2002) identified three categories of SA measurement: 
Explicit measures, implicit measures, and subjective measures.  Explicit 
measures are those that simply ask the subject to report information about the 
recent state of an aircraft; implicit measures are those that infer a level of SA 
from other measures of task performance; and subjective measures are based 
solely on opinion. 
Explicit measures can provide specific detailed information about the 
operator's concept of a situation that can then be objectively evaluated against 
reality (Endsley, 1995). This method typically takes the form of questionnaires 
that can be administered following the completion of a task, during the course of 
its execution, or while the task is paused (DoD, 2012; Uhlarik & Comerford, 2002; 
Wickens et al., 1984; etc.).  Each approach has its benefits and drawbacks.  
Post-task questionnaires allow the subject ample time to respond to lengthy 
questionnaires, but are limited by the level of detail that can be remembered 
throughout an entire task (Endsley, 1995).   Questions asked during the 
execution of a task overcome the memory limitation, but may impose additional 
workload that can alter performance.  The intrusiveness of the measure can be 
reduced when the task can be frozen, as by pausing a simulator and blanking the 
displays (Tsang & Vidulich, 2006).   
One such tool that employs a “freeze technique” is the Situation 
Awareness Global Assessment Tool (SAGAT) (Endsley, 1995). This tool is 
based on developing a global list of SA requirements for a given system and 
task, and then asking the subject questions based on this list at random intervals 
throughout the simulation. SAGAT is generally considered to offer high sensitivity 
to changes in situation awareness, but it can be intrusive when the simulator is 




Implicit measures are objective, non-intrusive, and relatively easy to 
collect in a simulator, but they are limited in their selectivity and sensitivity 
(Endsley, 1995).   These measures can be collected globally, or for just a specific 
sub-task of interest.  Global measures are not particularly reliable for measuring 
SA due to the multitude of cognitive factors (many unrelated to SA) that can 
affect overall performance (Uhlarik & Comerford, 2002). Imbedded task 
measures offer improved selectivity over global measures, however the results 
may be misleading because changes in a single component of SA can greatly 
impact other components of SA (Endsley, 1995).   For this reason, imbedded 
task measures  are rarely used (Uhlarik & Comerford, 2002). 
Subjective measures of SA are inexpensive and easy to use, but have 
many significant limitations.  Self-rated subjective measures of SA are inherently 
limited by the fact that an operator (by definition) does not know whether his own 
SA is incomplete or inaccurate (Uhlarik & Comerford, 2002). Furthermore, 
subjective self-ratings tend to be confounded by the effects of performance and 
workload (Endsley, 1995). Conversely, observer-rated measures of SA are 
inherently limited in what the observer can know about an operator's concept of a 
situation.  An observer can reliably detect overt errors related to SA, but little 
more (Uhlarik & Comerford, 2002). 
3. Using Multiple Measures 
There is no consensus in the literature on a single preferred instrument for 
measuring mental workload or situation awareness.  Selcon, Taylor, and Koritsas 
(1991) acknowledged that measures of workload and SA have a lot in common, 
but each captures certain aspects of performance that the other one does not.  
Rubio, Diaz, Martin and Puente (2004) evaluated several such measures of 
workload for intrusiveness, sensitivity, validity, diagnosticity, and acceptance, and 
found that no single measure outperformed the others in every category.  Tsang 
and Vidulich (2006) noted several situations that could lead to dissociation of 




cognizant of the idiosyncratic properties of the different measures.”  As a result of 
this diversity of opinion, multiple measures of workload and SA are often used in 
aviation human performance studies. The choice of which measures to use is 
situation dependent, and requires the experimenter to have good working 
knowledge of the strengths and limitations of each of the available tools (Lysaght 
et al., 1989; Muckler & Seven, 1992). 
E. SUMMARY 
The design of the Space Shuttle’s data processing system provides the 
flight crew with a large volume of information gathered from a variety of onboard 
and external sources.  The chief objective of this literature review has been to 
survey the human factors principles that relate to the way in which this 
information is organized and presented in a cockpit design.  Together, these 
principles support a method of critically evaluating a cockpit design change and 
assessing its effectiveness.   
The critical evaluation must begin with a thorough task analysis in order to 
gain an understanding of what is required of the design.  With this in mind, the 
evaluation must consider the layout of the displays from the operator perspective, 
the formatting of information on each display, the hardware attributes, and the 
display-control relationship.  Guidelines have been established for each of these 
characteristics.   
In order to assess the effectiveness of design changes, measures of flight 
crew mental workload and situation awareness are needed.  Several such 
measures can be found in the literature, each with its own advantages and 
disadvantages.  Multiple measures are therefore needed to ensure a thorough 
assessment.  Careful analysis of MW and SA data can show what improvements 
exist and where.  Tracing these results back to the critical design evaluation can 
offer insight into why.  The use of multiple measures of MW and SA presents an 






The evaluation begins with a critique of the CAU program design 
modifications, and then proceeds to an assessment of the effectiveness of these 
changes. The design critique is centered around a task analysis of crew 
operations in both ascent and entry phases of flight. It examines the 
modifications in terms of cockpit layout, design principles, hardware attributes, 
and display control. Paired astronaut crews flying identical simulated scenarios in 
the baseline and upgraded CAU configurations were then assessed using MW 
and SA measures.  These results were then analyzed for statistical significance. 
B. DESIGN CRITIQUE 
The design changes between the baseline and CAU cockpit display 
formats were evaluated according to established human factors principles.  
Central to this evaluation was a task analysis of flight crew activities during 
ascent and entry phases of flight.  This task analysis was used to define a set of 
information display requirements.  From this, the cockpit display upgrades were 
evaluated in terms of cockpit layout, display design, hardware attributes, and 
display control. The evaluations were conducted using a wide variety of 
documents that describe Space Shuttle cockpit hardware and software 
characteristics (e.g., Jenkins, 2010; Thomsen & Hancock, 1994; Tranthien, 
1995).   
1. Task Analysis 
Two complementary task analysis techniques were used to evaluate the 
design changes. First, a basic hierarchical task analysis was used to identify the 
display-related crewmember tasks during ascent and entry operations.  Once 
display-related tasks were identified, the HTA was not developed further.  Based 




requirements and display support in each cockpit for each identified task.  The 
results of this stage of the evaluation were used to guide subsequent stages.   
2. Design Eye and Display Placement 
The astronauts’ field of view must be taken into consideration for this 
critique.  Although no changes were made in the physical arrangement of display 
hardware, changes made to the display formats can affect the availability of key 
pieces of information.  This portion of the critique therefore began by finding the 
design eye position for each crew station.  Next, optimum and maximum visual 
fields were used to determine what displays are most readily visible to each crew 
station.  The optimum and maximum fields were based on the limits established 
by Huchingson (1981), defined in the previous chapter.  Viewing angle limits of 
the display hardware were considered as well. Finally, by using typical layouts of 
display formats for both the baseline and CAU cockpits, lists were developed for 
each crew station detailing what information is most readily visible. 
3. Display Formats 
Every display format in the shuttle cockpit was examined and modified as 
part of the CAU program.  In addition, the organizational structure was modified 
such that there is not a one-to-one mapping of old display formats to new ones.  
Display formats were variously added, deleted, consolidated, and rearranged in 
order to meet the design objectives.   
For this critique, the display formats were grouped according to task.  
Task categories include: (1) Monitoring flight parameters (altitude, speed, 
heading, etc.); (2) Systems Management; and (3) Monitoring trajectory.  Display 
formats within each of these categories share certain characteristics that allowed 
them to be evaluated collectively. Within each category, differences were 
highlighted between the CAU and baseline displays.  These differences are then 




4. Display Hardware 
Although no changes have been made to the shuttle’s MDU hardware, 
there are nonetheless some hardware attributes worth examining in this 
evaluation. The display hardware was examined first for its general suitability 
within the cockpit, and then for its suitability in displaying the CAU display 
formats. The first part of the critique was conducted by checklist method, wherein 
display hardware specifications are evaluated against NASA and DoD standards.  
The second part of the critique was done by comparing MDU color capabilities 
with the requirements of the CAU formats. 
5. Display Control 
Although no major changes were made to the layout of the keypads and 
bezel keys used to control the displays, changes to the display formats can 
significantly affect the display-control relationship.  This portion of the critique 
examined that relationship.  The hardware characteristics of the controls were 
first evaluated according to NASA and DoD standards to examine their suitability 
for data entry and display configuration tasks.  Next, the relationships between 
the control hardware and the information displays were evaluated for both the 
baseline and CAU designs.  The evaluation focused on principles of stimulus-
response compatibility, and examined both proximity and coding.   
C. DESIGN ASSESSMENT 
The testing process was designed around a set of minimum success 
criteria, which provided the standard by which the updated displays would be 
evaluated (McCandless, 2004). Achieving the minimum success criteria would 
indicate that the program was successful, whereas failure to meet the criteria 
would have resulted in either a redesign of the displays, or cancellation of the 
entire project.  The goals for the minimum success criteria were baselined by the 




independent reviews (McCandless, 2004).  The minimum success criteria were 
divided into three categories, presented in Table 7. 
 
Category Definition Goals 
Situation 
Awareness 
Situation awareness is 
defined as a crew member's 
understanding of his or her 
dynamic flight environment 
with respect to the mission.  
a) Trajectory, horizontal situation, 
alternate landing sites, abort 
determination and monitoring: 
100% improvement 
b) DPS, EPS, MPS, OMS 
monitoring and failure recognition: 
50% improvement 
c) Other system monitoring and 




Workload is defined as the 
mental effort necessary to 
perform a task.   
Reduce workload, as measured by 
Bedford and NASA TLX 
Performance Performance is a measure of 
how well the crew 
accomplished the appropriate 
tasks in the cockpit.   
a) Reduction in unidentified 
malfunctions and recognition time 
b) Reduction in errors 
c) Reduction in keystrokes 
Table 7.   Minimum Success Criteria (After McCandless, 2004) 
1. Participants 
The evaluation was conducted with six crews of three astronauts each.  
Each crew included a flown pilot or commander in the commander seat, an 
unflown pilot in the pilot seat, and an unflown mission specialist in the mission 
specialist 2 (MS2) seat.  These three positions are the primary "stake-holders" in 
the CAU upgrade, which makes them the appropriate subjects for the evaluation.  
The goal with this crew make-up was to test the displays with relatively new  
astronauts who would have the least amount of ingrained experience and 





Training in the baseline configuration was not required because of the 
level of familiarity the participants had already acquired through several years of 
experience and training.  Training in the CAU configuration was conducted over 
the course of 3-4 weeks.  It consisted of 20 hours of classroom training, 5 hours 
of Dynamic Skills Trainer (DST) training, and 10 hours of familiarization sessions 
in the Shuttle Mission Simulator. 
2. Instruments 
a. Subjective Workload 
The workload measures taken for the evaluation, the BWRS (see Table 9) 
and the NASA TLX (see Table 10), are subjective assessments.  Both methods 
were discussed in the previous chapter.  Workload measures were collected from 
each crewmember at the completion of each run.  
 
Rating Description 
1 Workload insignificant. 
2 Workload low. 
3 Enough spare capacity for all desirable additional tasks. 
4 Insufficient spare capacity for easy attention to additional tasks. 
5 Reduced spare capacity. Additional tasks cannot be given the desired 
amount of attention 
6 Little spare capacity. Level of effort allows little attention to additional tasks. 
7 Very little spare capacity, but maintenance of effort in the primary tasks is 
not in question 
8 Very high workload with almost no spare capacity. Difficulty in maintaining 
level of effort. 
9 Extremely high workload. No spare capacity. Serious doubts as to ability to 
maintain level of effort. 
10 Task abandoned. Unable to apply sufficient effort. 





1) Mental demand (from low to high on a scale of 1 to 10): How much mental and 
perceptual activity was required (e.g., thinking, deciding, calculating, 
remembering, looking, searching, etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, simple 
or complex, exacting or forgiving?  
2) Physical demand (from low to high on a scale of 1 to 10): How much physical 
activity was required (e.g., pushing, pulling, turning, controlling activating, etc.)? 
Was the task easy or demanding, slow or brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or 
laborious?  
3) Temporal demand (from low to high on a scale of 1 to 10): How much time 
pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the tasks or task elements 
occurred? Was the pace slow and leisurely or rapid and frantic?  
4) Performance (from good to poor on a scale of 1 to 10): How successful do you 
think you were in accomplishing the goals of the task set by the researchers (or 
yourself)? How satisfied were you with your performance in accomplishing these 
goals? 
5) Effort (from low to high on a scale of 1 to 10): How hard did you have to work 
(mentally and physically) to accomplish your level of performance? 
6) Frustration (from low to high on a scale of 1 to 10): How insecure, discouraged, 
irritated, stressed and annoyed versus secure, gratified, content, relaxed, and 
complacent did you feel during the task? 
Table 9.   NASA TLX Rating Components (After McCandless, 2004) 
b. Situation Awareness 
The SA data can be divided into objective and subjective categories.  
Objective questions were those that had a definitive correct or incorrect answer.  
These questions were based on the SAGAT discussed in the previous chapter.  
Objective SA questions related to trajectory management, critical system status, 
and non-critical system status.  An example of an objective question is:  
What was your trajectory energy state at the 
beginning of the run (circle one)? 




Subjective ratings were based on crewmembers' opinions, and had no 
correct or incorrect answer. Subjective SA questions related to trajectory 
management, critical system status, and non-critical system status.  An example 
of a subjective question is: 
Rate your situational awareness of the fuel cell 
problem as provided by the displays. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The subjective rating scale used for rating situation awareness is 




1 Completely unaware of situation 
2 Mostly unaware of situation and totally unable to monitor/follow-up 
3 Somewhat aware of situation and mostly unable to monitor/follow-up 
Reduced SA 
4 Somewhat aware of situation and somewhat able to monitor/follow-up 
5 Mostly aware of situation and somewhat able to monitor/follow-up 
Adequate SA 
6 Mostly aware of situation and mostly able to monitor/follow-up 
7 Completely aware of situation and somewhat able to monitor/follow-up 
Excellent SA 
8 Completely aware of situation and mostly able to monitor/follow-up 
9 Completely aware of situation and completely able to monitor/follow-up 
Perfect SA 
10 Completely aware of situation, completely able to monitor/follow-up, and 
aware of next worst failure 





One to two observers were in the cockpit for every run, all were either 
astronauts or members of the NASA evaluation team.  Additional observers were 
in the instructor station.  Cockpit observers, as trained evaluators, provided a 
unique perspective on non-verbal communication. These observers provided 
subjective data by estimating crew situation awareness and workload.  
Observers in the instructor station were used to monitor crew actions and record 
objective data on errors, unrecognized malfunctions, and recognition times. 
4. Apparatus 
a. Simulator 
The evaluation was conducted in the Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS) at 
NASA JSC in Houston, Texas.  This full motion simulator replicates all aspects of 
the shuttle cockpit and provides high-fidelity simulation of shuttle ascent and 
entry operations.  For this evaluation, the simulator was configured with two 
classes of displays: Baseline, and CAU. Baseline displays are the Orbiter 
Increment-29 (OI-29) displays in the MEDS cockpit.  CAU displays are the OI-41 
redesigned displays.   
The simulator was used to record the number of key presses on the DPS 
keypads.  These data were divided into key presses related to display navigation, 
and those use for other functions.  The number of display edge keys pressed and 
switches thrown was also recorded. 
b. Flight Data File 
The evaluation only included ascent and entry flight phases.  The five FDF 
procedure books associated with ascent and entry were updated to account for 






modifications were avoided to eliminate the potential of misinterpreting FDF 
improvements as cockpit improvements.  The Baseline testing evaluations used 
the FDF from shuttle flight STS-112. 
5. Procedure 
The evaluation process was centered around the execution of scripted 
formal scenarios simulated with both the baseline and CAU cockpit displays.  
These scenarios included normal ascents, aborts (including RTLS, TAL, and 
ATO), normal entry (under both PASS and BFS guidance), and off normal entry. 
The purpose of the Baseline testing was to evaluate the existing Baseline 
shuttle cockpit to provide a basis of comparison for the CAU cockpit.  After an 
interlude of 8 to 11 months, the CAU displays were evaluated under the same 
conditions as the Baseline testing.  The interlude was intended to reduce the 
chances that the crews would remember the details of the scripted scenarios 
during the testing on the CAU displays.  Baseline testing was run over October - 
December, 2003, whereas CAU testing was run over August - September, 2004. 
For each cockpit, the crews participated in three data collection sessions, 
each lasting about 2 hours.  Each session included eight scripted runs, which 
were identical in both baseline and CAU evaluation.  Session 1 was comprised of 
entry runs and sessions 2 and 3 were comprised of ascent runs.  The runs 
consisted of short (approximately 10 minute) time slices of a given flight phase.  
The start and end point for each script varied based on the required test 
objectives.  Each run contained several simulated malfunctions, which were 
designed to test the effect of the modifications to the displays.  Throughout each 
scenario, observers recorded various objective measures of crew performance.  
At the end of each script, the simulator was frozen and the questionnaires were 




D. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Table 11 provides a summary of the data collected in each run.  Data for 
each measure were collected in both the ascent and entry phases of operations, 
and in both the baseline and CAU design configurations.  Individual measures 
were collected for each of the six commanders, pilots, and mission specialists. 
 




MW Subjective BWRS 
NASA TLX 
SA Subjective Trajectory Awareness  
Critical System Awareness  
Non-critical System Awareness  
Objective  Trajectory Status Questions 
Critical System Status  
Non-critical System Status  
Observer MW Objective BWRS 
SA Subjective Trajectory Awareness  
Critical System Awareness  
Non-critical System Awareness  
Performance Objective Number of Errors 
Malfunction Recognize Time  
Simulator Performance Objective Navigation Key Presses 
Non-navigation Key Presses 
Switches Thrown 
MDU Edge Key Presses 
Table 11.   List of MW, SA, & Performance Measures Collected  
The data were examined with a series of statistical tests intended to 
address the research questions of this thesis.  The first research question asked 
if the CAU design changes led to improvements in MW and SA.  It was then 
asked whether or not these changes were greater for one specific crew position 





statistical evaluation of how MW and SA were affected by differences in design, 
crew position, and phase of operations.  To this end, a series of Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) were conducted.  
Because of data set limitations, not every measure was included in the 
ANOVA.  Some measures were under-sampled for certain conditions, and some 
errors were made in recording data.  Ultimately, only one measure of MW, and 
one type of SA measure were used.  The decision of which measures to use was 
based on available sample sizes, and variance within each measure.  For MW, 
BWRS results were used.  For each of the components of SA (Trajectory, Critical 
Systems, and Non-Critical Systems), subjective measures were used.   
An initial round of ANOVA tests were conducted that included a nested, 
within-subjects design to examine the significance of individual differences.  The 
results of these tests indicated that the effect of subjects was insignificant.  
Having demonstrated that individual differences are minimal, the design was 
reduced to a purely between-factors ANOVA.  Although this approach bends the 
assumption of strict independence of observations, this deviation is appropriate 
given the homogeneity of the sample population. 
Ultimately, the ANOVA tests for MW and SA included three fixed factors: 
design (Baseline vs CAU), phase of operations (Ascent vs Entry), and position 
(CDR vs PLT vs MS2). For each of these tests, results were considered 
statistically significant if analysis rejected the null hypothesis of no difference 
between levels of a factor or interaction between factors at an alpha level of .05.  
Where significant effects were found, post-hoc analysis was conducted using 









A. DESIGN CRITIQUE 
The organization of information in the baseline MEDS cockpit is 
constrained by the inherent limitations of the legacy cockpit from which it is 
functionally derived.  Information was divided according to its source, which could 
include analog instruments, PASS, and BFS software.  As a result, information 
about one system or even one flight parameter is sometimes scattered across 
two or more display formats, not all of which can be viewed at any one time.  
Extensive display navigation is sometimes needed to gather required system and 
subsystem information.  Furthermore, some tasks (such as identifying available 
landing sites based on energy state) require that the crew consult printed Flight 
Data Files (FDF), which contain the tables needed to manually perform the 
required calculation.   
A design objective of the CAU program was to resolve these problems by 
consolidating information from multiple sources onto a single display to create 
display formats that are more task-oriented.  These formats include single-source 
system summary pages (such as MPS Sum, APU/HYD Sum, etc), as well as 
single-source pages for monitoring trajectory performance (such as Ascent TRAJ 
and Entry TRAJ).   
1. Task Analysis 
The results of the hierarchical task analysis for ascent and entry display-
related tasks are presented in Figures 12 and 13, respectively.  In general, tasks 
can be divided into GNC and SM functions that are performed concurrently 
throughout Ascent and Entry phases.  Each phase also includes an additional set 
of tasks associated with responding to off-nominal conditions.  Each bottom-level 
task presented represents a requirement for an information display.  These 





Figure 12.   Display Related Tasks During Ascent and Abort 
 





The manner in which these information requirements are met differs 
greatly between the baseline and CAU cockpit configurations.  These differences 
were examined through a task decomposition process in which specific 
information requirements for each task were identified, along with the associated 
displays within each cockpit design.  These results are presented in Tables 12 
and 13 for Ascent and Entry operations, respectively.  Of note, a minimum of 10 
necessary display formats were identified in the baseline design, compared to 




Baseline Formats CAU Formats 
Monitor Maneuvers Vehicle Attitude 
 
ADI/AVVI and HSI/AMI; 




DPS Trajectory data BFS Ascent TRAJ 







Power setting, fuel 
remaining 
OMS/MPS Sum Ascent TRAJ 
Track Abort 
Boundaries 
DPS Trajectory data BFS Ascent TRAJ Ascent TRAJ 
Monitor Navigation 
Performance 
Δ between PASS and 
BFS guidance 
BFS Ascent TRAJ and 
PASS Ascent TRAJ 
Ascent TRAJ 
Monitor for System 
Faults 
Failure annunciation Fault Sum Fault Sum 
Diagnose System 
Faults 
Parameters for MPS, 
OMS, DPS, EPS, 
ECLSS, APU/Hyd, 
Nav, RCS systems 
BFS Sys Sum, GNC 
Sys Sum, MPS/OMS 
sum, APU/Hyd Sum 
CAU System-Specific 
Displays 




BFS TRAJ (DPS), and 







based on current 
energy state 
Relayed by radio or 
computed by energy 
state and cue cards 
H Sit 






Baseline Formats CAU Formats 
Monitor Maneuvers Vehicle Attitude 
 
ADI/AVVI & HSI/AMI; 




DPS Trajectory data BFS &/or PASS Entry 
Trajectory 
Entry TRAJ 
Track Energy state & 
available landing sites 
Runways reachable 
based on current 
energy state 
Relayed by radio or 
computed by energy 




Δ between PASS and 
BFS guidance 
BFS  Entry TRAJ & 
PASS Entry TRAJ 
Entry TRAJ 
Monitor for system 
faults 
Failure annunciation Fault Sum Fault Sum 
Diagnose system 
faults 
Parameters for MPS, 
OMS, DPS, EPS, 
ECLSS, APU/Hyd, 
Nav, RCS systems 
BFS Sys Sum, GNC 
Sys Sum, MPS/OMS 
sum, APU/Hyd Sum 
CAU System-specific 
Displays 
Fly Entry manually Basic flight 
instruments, DPS 
computed trajectory 
HSI/AMI & ADI/AVVI, 
BFS or PASS Entry 
TRAJ 
PFD, Entry TRAJ 
Table 13.   Summary of Display Related Tasks During Entry 
Task responsibilities are different for each crew position.  For redundancy, 
individual crew positions are assigned overlapping Primary and Secondary 
responsibilities.  These requirements can be varied by individual crews, but a 




Position Primary Secondary 
CDR Track Trajectory 
Track Abort Boundaries  
Monitor DPS, ECLSS systems 
Monitor OMS, RCS, Flight Control 
Systems 
PLT Monitor MPS, EPS, APU/HYD, OMS, 
RCS, and Flight Control Systems 
Track Trajectory 
MS2 Overhead Panels  
Overhead Gauges  
Track Abort Boundaries 
Consult Reference Data (cue cards) 
Table 14.   Typical Flight Crew Duties During Ascent and Entry  
(From NASA, 2002) 
2. Design Eye and Display Placement 
 No changes were made to the shuttle seating positions or display 
locations as a result of the CAU program.  Therefore, DEPs and fields of view for 
both the baseline and the upgraded cockpits are identical.  The DEPs of the 
Commander and Mission Specialist crew stations are presented from front, side, 
and overhead views in Figures 14, 15, and 16, respectively. The position of the 
pilot station mirrors that of the commander station.  
 
Note: Linear units are inches and angular units are degrees. 
Figure 14.   Side View of Shuttle Cockpit Measurements  





Note: Linear units are inches and angular units are degrees. 
Figure 15.   Side View of Shuttle Cockpit Measurements  
(From McCandless, 2003) 
 
 
Note: Linear units are inches and angular units are degrees. 
Figure 16.   Top View of Shuttle Cockpit Measurements  




The optimum visual field for the commander’s station was determined to 
be a 16-inch diameter circle centered on the top edge of the CDR2 display unit.  
This circle encompasses the entire CDR2 display, and the rightmost portions of 
the CDR1 display.  The maximum field of view was determined to be a rectangle 
42 inches wide, and 35 inches in height.  This rectangle includes the remainder 
of the CDR1 display, as well as the complete CRT1 and MFD 1 units. Allowing 
for head movement, the commander is limited only by the viewing angle limits of 
the display hardware.  Given these limits, the commander can see all MDUs with 
the exception of the two PLT units.  The pilot’s side mirrors the commander’s 
side.  The visibility of each MDU from the Commander’s position is summarized 




 Within optimum field of view 
 Within maximum field of view 
 Within hardware viewing angle limits  
   (Head movement required) 
 Not viewable 
 
Figure 17.   Display Availability for Commander Position 
The optimum visual field for the mission specialist station was determined 
to be a 32-inch diameter circle centered on the CRT3 display.  This circle 
encompasses all five of the central MDUs.  The maximum field of view was 
determined to include the entire forward instrument panel.  The Mission 





of the outboard-most units is partially obstructed by the commander and pilot 
seats.  The visibility of each MDU from the Mission Specialist’s position is 





 Within optimum field of view 
 Within maximum field of view 
 Within hardware viewing angle limits  
   (Head movement required) 
 Not viewable 
 
Figure 18.   Display Availability for MS2 Position 
In the baseline configuration, the arrangement of display formats across 
each of the MDUs can be varied based on crew preference and phase of flight.  
A typical display layout for the baseline configuration is described in the Shuttle 
Crew Operations Manual (see Figure 19).  Using this typical configuration, the 
relative accessibility of each display format was determined for each crew 
position (see Table 15). 
 








Displays visible with 
head movement 
















Table 15.   Display Format Availability in a Typical Baseline Configuration 
As with the baseline design, the layout of display formats across each of 
the MDUs can be varied.  A typical display layout for the CAU configuration is 
described in the CAU display dictionary (see Figure 20).  Using this typical 
configuration, the relative accessibility of each display format was determined for 
each crew position (see Table 16). 
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Table 16.   Display Format Availability in a Typical CAU Configuration. 
3. Display Formats 
Display format changes were evaluated according to the principles of 
display design (see Chapter II).  Several dozen distinct display formats exist in 
each cockpit configuration, and there is no direct relationship between Baseline 
and CAU formats.  Therefore, to evaluate design changes, displays were 
grouped according to function.  Comparisons were made using representative 
example display formats from each cockpit design.  Where applicable, design 
changes were described in terms of Perceptual Principles, Attentional Principles, 
Mental Model Principles, and Memory Principles. 
a. Primary Flight Instruments 
Display formats were provided in both baseline and CAU cockpits 
that present graphical representations of legacy ADI, HSI, AMI, and AVVI 
instruments. These instruments provided information about basic flight 
parameters, such as attitude, speed, altitude, rate of climb, angle of attack, and 
heading.  In the baseline cockpit, this information was provided by the HSI/AMI 
(see Figure 21) and ADI/AVVI (see Figure 22) display formats.  Alternately, a 




instruments onto a single page.  In the CAU cockpit, this information was 
provided solely by the Primary Flight Display (PFD) format (see Figure 24).  The 
arrangement of these instruments in the CAU’s PFD format was similar to the 
baseline cockpit's Composite ADI/HSI display, but some changes were made in 
the presentation of the information. The changes are discussed in the sections 
that follow. 
 
Figure 21.   Baseline HSI/AMI Display 
 





Figure 23.   Baseline Composite ADI/HSI Display 
 
Figure 24.   CAU Primary Flight Display (Ascent Configuration) 
Perceptual and Attentional Principles 
The changes made in the use of color are immediately apparent when 
comparing the two displays.  While the baseline display used several inconsistent 




color scheme.  In the baseline display, separator lines and non-critical elements 
sometimes have as much contrast with the background as the messages 
themselves.  For example, the boxes surrounding the numerical readouts are 
colored in green and magenta, and the backgrounds for the rate sliders around 
the ADI are blue.  This unnecessary contrast decreases the relative salience of 
the important signals, thereby hindering perception.  The CAU cockpit format 
presents these less critical elements in dark grey to reduce their contrast with the 
background, while presenting important signals in white, maximizing contrast.   
A similar effect was achieved by minimizing the clutter in the bottom half of 
the display.  The format of the accelerometer (g-meter), for example, was 
changed from a prominently colored moving tape display in the baseline cockpit 
to a less salient dial and pointer display in the CAU.  Other display elements 
have simply been removed when not needed.  This reduction in clutter makes it 
easier to maintain focused attention on the more critical elements. 
The location of the digital readouts associated with each of the vertical 
tape instruments was changed from being above the tapes in the baseline 
cockpit, to being centered on the tapes in the CAU.  This change exploits the 
proximity compatibility principle, as it makes it  easier for the astronaut to 
mentally integrate the digital readout with the moving tape.  In addition, this 
change brings the digital readouts in line with the centerline of the ADI, enabling 
a quick scan in a straight horizontal line.  This helps to minimize the cost of 
moving selective attention from one instrument to the next.   
Memory Principles 
With the exception of the previously mentioned accelerometer, CAU 
instruments move and operate in the same way as the baseline instruments.  
The CAU displays therefore remain consistent with the experience of the existing 





b. Guidance and Navigation 
In general, there are two types of display formats used throughout 
both cockpits that provide guidance and navigation information: (1) Trajectory, 
and (2) Horizontal situation.  Trajectory displays (sometimes called vertical 
situation displays) present a side view of the shuttle’s trajectory, and horizontal 
situation displays present a top-down view.  These formats are task specific, with 
different variants being used at each stage of ascent, entry, and abort.  However, 
these formats had many common characteristics and were evaluated collectively.   
In the baseline cockpit, this information was provided by a variety of 
MM-specific DPS formats.  For ascent, only trajectory formats were provided 
(see Figure 25).  For entry, both trajectory and horizontal situation formats were 
provided.  In each case, separate formats were provided by PASS and BFS 
software.  In the CAU cockpit, both trajectory and horizontal situation formats 
were provided for both ascent and entry (see Figures 26 and 27).  Information 
from PASS and BFS software was integrated into a single page.  The changes 
are discussed in the sections that follow. 
 
 





Figure 26.   CAU Ascent Trajectory Display 
Perceptual Principles 
The baseline formats used a simple green on black color scheme for all 
information.  The CAU formats, in comparison, used multiple colors to distinguish 
between various classes of information (see Appendix B).  This change 
increases the salience and discriminability of the important signals, thereby 
improving perception. 
Attentional Principles 
The CAU displays consolidated information that, in the baseline cockpit, 
was spread across multiple displays.  For example, the CAU ascent trajectory 
format (see Figure 25) combines the relevant portions of the baseline PASS and 
BFS ascent trajectory displays.  In addition, the CAU format incorporates 
performance information for the main propulsion system, which must be mentally 
integrated with trajectory information during ascent.  In the baseline cockpit, MPS 
performance information was provided on a separate display format.   This 
change exploits the proximity compatibility principle, and reduces the division of 




The CAU's ascent horizontal situation display (see Figure 27) has no 
direct antecedent in the baseline cockpit.  This display format provides 
information about the horizontal flight path and abort options during ascent. This 
information was not provided on any display in the baseline cockpit.  The 
determination of abort options was computed automatically at mission control 
center, and was relayed to the crew by voice communication when needed.  In 
the event of communication failure, the determination had to be done manually 
by reference to primary flight instruments and a printed flight data file.  
Incorporating this information into a single display greatly reduces the information 
access cost associated with understanding abort options. 
 
 
Figure 27.   CAU Ascent Horizontal Situation Display 
c. Systems & Fault Management 
System summary display formats were developed for the CAU in order to 
consolidate status information about ECLSS, DPS, Navigation, Control, RCS, 




unique, they all have many characteristics in common and were therefore 
evaluated collectively.   The changes are discussed in the sections that follow. 
Attentional Principles 
In the baseline cockpit, subsystem information was spread across multiple 
displays, organized according to its source.  For example, system parameters 
that were monitored by BFS software were found on the BFS system summary 
display format (see Figure 28).  Some other system parameters were presented 
on dedicated display formats (e.g., MPS/OMS summary, see Figure 29).  The 
CAU display formats were instead organized according to the subsystem(s) 
being represented.  Information for a given subsystem was pulled from all 
available sources, and presented on a single display (see Figure 30).  The CAU 
design changes, therefore, both exploited the proximity compatibility principle, 
and reduced the effort needed to shift selective attention between different 
information sources.   
 
 





Figure 29.   Baseline OMS/MPS Display 
 






In the baseline cockpit, most system information was presented in the 
form of green text over a black background.  Numbers, labels, and dividing lines 
were all presented in the same color.  The upgraded CAU formats instead 
exploited color to enable the crew to differentiate between the various classes of 
information, especially during off-nominal conditions (see Appendix B).  
Mental Model & Memory Principles 
Baseline and CAU cockpits differ greatly in the use of graphics.  While the 
baseline display formats used matrices of numbers to convey information about a 
system, the CAU formats (where appropriate) incorporated this information into a 
rudimentary system schematic.  The schematics depicted critical relationships 
between various system components.  Icons were added to show the status of 
valves, and malfunctions are indicated by changing the color of the represented 
component.  Instead of using a matrix of numbers, important values were placed 
on the schematic according to the component they relate to.   
4. Display Hardware 
 No changes were made to the shuttle display hardware as a result of the 
CAU program.  Therefore, both the baseline and the upgraded cockpits have the 
same physical attributes.  Each MDU consists of a 6.7 inch square full-color 
active matrix liquid crystal display (AMLCD), a brightness control knob, six 
programmable edge keys, and an on-off switch.  All of the displays are readable 
in sunlight and can be viewed from +/- 60 degrees horizontally, and -10 deg/+45 
degrees vertically.  They have a pixel density of 172 ppi, a refresh rate of 60Hz, 
and a high ambient contrast ratio exceeding 6:1 (Thomsen & Hancock, 1994). All 
of these parameters are within current NASA standards with the exception of 
ambient contrast ratio, which is required to by 10:1.  For comparison, current 
department of defense standards only require ambient contrast ratio of 5:1 for 




5. Display Control 
In both the baseline and CAU configurations, display content is controlled 
through display edge-keys and keypads.  No changes were made to the 
locations of these keys. The edge keys are used to navigate among available 
display formats.  The keypads are used to provide data entry within certain 
display formats.  In the baseline configuration, this data entry was only applicable 
to the three CRT display units when displaying DPS formats.  In the CAU 
configuration, data can be entered into any display unit whenever an appropriate 
format is being displayed (McCandless, 2004).  This change allows for a greater 
level of proximity compatibility when data entry is done on displays that are 
closer to the keypad (such as the MFD or CDR2 display), but it also opens the 
possibility for poor proximity compatibility when data entry is done on more distal 
displays.   
NASA STD 3001 requires that there be a “logical and explicit” relationship 
between a control and its associated display.  For display navigation, this 
requirement is met equally with the display edge keys in both the CAU and 
baseline cockpit.  For data entry, this requirement is met by both the baseline 
and CAU configurations, but is best achieved in the CAU configuration when 
displays formats requiring data entry are selected on the MDUs that are closest 
to the keypad.   
B. DESIGN ASSESSMENT 
1. Mental Workload 
The results of the ANOVA for MW are presented in Table 17.  The three-
way interaction was not found to be significant. Significant two-way interaction 
effects were found between Design and Phase of Operations, and between 
Design and Position.  Both of these effects were found to be significant at the 
p<.01 level.  The results also revealed a highly significant main effect for Design.  




addressing.  Plots of the data, Figures 31 and 32, reveal that the CAU design 
greatly outperforms the Baseline design in terms of MW. 
 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p
Design 1503.34 1 1503.34 643.79 0.000
Ops 49.80 1 49.80 21.30 0.000
Position 8.40 2 4.20 1.80 0.267
Design x Ops 23.04 1 23.04 9.86 0.002
Design x Position 29.54 2 14.77 5.05 0.002
Ops x Position 12.76 2 6.38 2.73 0.066
Design x Ops x Position 10.54 2 5.27 2.25 0.106
Error 1655.50 708 2.34  
Total 3448.99 719   
Table 17.   ANOVA for Mental Workload 
To identify the details of Design/Operations interaction, the differences 
between Baseline and CAU designs were plotted for both Ascent and Entry 
operations (see Figure 31).  Between Baseline and CAU designs, crews 
appeared to show a greater decrease in MW during ascent phases when 
compared to entry phases.   
Post hoc comparisons were used to verify the significance of this 
interaction. The mean workload measure for the Baseline Ascent condition 
(M=7.0) was found to be significantly different from the Baseline Entry condition 
(M=6.1).  However, the CAU ascent condition (M=3.7) did not significantly differ 
from the CAU entry condition (M=3.5).  Both baseline conditions were 
significantly different from both CAU conditions.  Taken together, these results 
indicate that the reduction in MW between baseline and CAU designs was 






Figure 31.   Interaction between Design and Phase of Operations  
for Mental Workload 
To identify the details of Design/Operations interaction, the differences 
between Baseline and CAU designs were plotted for each of the crew positions 
(see Figure 32).  Between Baseline and CAU designs, Mission Specialists 
appeared to show a lesser reduction in MW than did Pilots and Commanders.   
Post hoc comparisons were used to verify the significance of this 
interaction. The mean workload measure for the baseline Mission Specialist 
position (6.0) did not significantly differ from the baseline Pilot position (M=6.7). 
However, the CAU Mission Specialist position (M=4.0) was found to be 
significantly different from the CAU Pilot position (M=3.2). All baseline positions 
were significantly different from all CAU positions.  Taken together, these results 
indicate that the reduction in mental workload between baseline and CAU 







Figure 32.   Interaction between Design and Crew Position  
for Mental Workload 
2. Situation Awareness of Trajectory 
The results of the ANOVA for situation awareness of trajectory revealed a 
significant three-way interaction at the p<.01 level (see Table 18).  To identify the 
details of this interaction, the data were divided by crew position, and the 
changes between Baseline and CAU designs were plotted for both Ascent and 
Entry operations (see Figures 33-35).  The plots for CDR and MS2 positions both 
indicated a greater increase in SA for ascent phases when compared to entry 
phases.  The plot for PLT position, by contrast, shows an equivalent increase in 
SA for entry and ascent phases.   
Post hoc comparisons were used to verify the significance of this 
difference.  CAU ascent PLT (M=8.6) was found to be significantly different from 
CAU entry PLT (M=7.8).  The CAU ascent/entry pairs for PLT and MS2 positions 
were not found to be significantly different from each other.  Baseline entry 




corresponding baseline ascent results.  Taken together, these results indicate 
that in terms of trajectory SA, pilots responded differently to the CAU upgrades 
than did commanders and mission specialists.  Between baseline and CAU 
designs, commanders and mission specialists showed a greater increase in SA 
during ascent phases when compared to entry phases.  Pilots, by contrast, 
improved at a more uniform rate across both phases of flight.   
The results also revealed a highly significant main effect for Design.  This 
effect was far greater than that of the interaction, and is therefore worth 
addressing.  Figures 33, 34, and 35, clearly reveal that the CAU design greatly 
outperforms the Baseline design in terms of situation awareness of trajectory. 
 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p
Design 8046.8 1 8046.8 3282.95 0.000 
Ops 209.27 1 209.27 85.38 0.000 
Position 30.40 2 15.20 6.20 0.002 
Design x Ops 40.57 1 40.57 16.55 0.000 
Design x Position 13.84 2 6.92 2.82 0.060 
Ops x Position 1.69 2 0.84 0.34 0.709 
Design x Ops x Position 23.73 2 11.86 4.84 0.008 
Error 3897.23 1590 2.45   
Total 14732.04 1601    






Figure 33.   Trajectory SA Interaction between Design and Phase of Operations  
for the Commander Crew Position  
 
Figure 34.   Trajectory SA Interaction between Design and Phase of Operations  





Figure 35.   Trajectory SA Interaction between Design and Phase of Operations  
at the Mission Specialist Crew Position 
3. Situation Awareness of Critical Systems 
The ANOVA for situation awareness of critical systems did not reveal a 
significant three-way interaction.  However, a significant two-way interaction was 
found between Design and Operations at the p<.01 level (see Table 19).  To 
identify the details of this interaction, the differences between baseline and CAU 
designs were plotted for both Ascent and Entry operations (see Figure 36).  
Between baseline and CAU designs, crews appeared to show a greater increase 
in critical system SA during ascent phases when compared to entry phases.   
Post hoc comparisons were used to verify the significance of this 
difference.  Baseline ascent SA was found to be significantly different from 
baseline entry SA. CAU ascent and entry SA were not found to be significantly 
different from each other.  Both baseline conditions were found to be significantly 
different than both ascent conditions.  Taken together, these results indicated 




operations as compared to entry operations.  Specifically, the changes yielded a 
greater increase in SA during Ascent operations than during Entry operations.  
The results also revealed a highly significant main effect for Design.  This 
effect was far greater than that of any interaction. As seen in Figure 36, the CAU 
design greatly outperforms the Baseline design in terms of situation awareness 
of critical systems. 
 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p
Design 10964.0 1 10964.0 5361.26 0.000
Ops 130.3 1 130.3 63.70 0.000
Position 48.4 2 24.2 11.84 0.000
Design x Ops 151.1 1 151.1 73.87 0.000
Design x Position 8.6 2 4.3 2.11 0.121
Ops x Position 8.1 2 4.0 1.98 0.139
Design x Ops x 
Position 
8.7 2 4.3 2.13 0.119
Error 6306.9 3084 2.0  
Total 24262.1 3095  






Figure 36.   Critical System SA Interaction between Design and  
Phase of Operations 
4. Situation Awareness of Non-critical Systems 
The ANOVA for situation awareness of non-critical systems did not reveal 
a significant three-way interaction.  However, a significant two-way interaction 
was found between Design and Operations at the p<.01 level (see Table 20).  To 
identify the details of this interaction, the differences in SA between baseline and 
CAU designs were plotted for both Ascent and Entry operations (see Figure 37).  
Between baseline and CAU designs, crews appeared to show a greater increase 
in non-critical system SA during ascent phases when compared to entry phases.   
Post hoc comparisons were used to verify the significance of this 
difference.  Baseline ascent SA was found to be significantly different from 
baseline entry SA. CAU ascent and entry SA were not found to be significantly 
different from each other.  Both baseline conditions were found to be significantly 
different than both ascent conditions.  Taken together, these results indicated 




ascent operations as compared to entry operations.  Specifically, the changes 
yielded a greater increase in SA during Ascent operations than during Entry 
operations.  
The results also revealed a highly significant main effect for Design.  This 
effect was far greater than that of any interaction. Once again, the CAU design 
greatly outperforms the Baseline design in terms of situation awareness of non-
critical systems (see Figure 37). 
 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p
Design 5480.17 1 5480.17 2586.7
1 
0.000
Ops 35.63 1 35.63 16.82 0.000
Position 17.38 2 8.69 4.10 0.017
Design x Ops 18.33 1 18.33 8.65 0.003
Design x Position 11.30 2 5.65 2.67 0.070
Ops x Position 6.11 2 3.05 1.44 0.237
Design x Ops x Position 5.72 2 2.86 1.35 0.260
Error 2402.48 1134 2.12  
Total 8137.70 1145   




























Figure 37.   Non-Critical System SA Interaction between Design  






V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The primary purpose of the study was to complete a thorough assessment 
of the Shuttle CAU design improvements and to develop recommendations for 
the design and evaluation of future systems based on the results of this 
assessment.  The evaluation began with a critique of the CAU design 
modifications in terms of task requirements, panel layout, design principles, 
hardware attributes, and display control.  Finally, the effectiveness of these 
modifications was examined using measures of MW and SA.  The statistical 
analysis focused on the measures with the highest quality data, which included 
Bedford Workload Rating Scale, and Subjective Situation Awareness. 
For every performance measure examined, a significant improvement was 
found between the baseline and CAU designs for all crew positions and in all 
phases of flight.  This was by far the strongest effect, with p-values on the order 
of 10-30 for every measure.  The analysis also revealed that these improvements 
were significantly greater for ascent operations than for entry in all but one 
measure.  That exception was found in the Trajectory Situation Awareness 
measure, wherein pilots improved at the same rate in both ascent and entry 
operations.   
The Ascent H-SIT display is a development that is applicable exclusively 
during ascent scenarios in the CAU cockpit.  This display is intended to improve 
ascent trajectory SA, particularly during highly dynamic (and attention-
demanding) abort scenarios.  It is typically visible from the Commander and 
Mission Specialist crew positions, but outside the maximum field of view for 
pilots.  The design critique also noted several changes in design that apply 
throughout all conditions.  Namely, the changes in the use of color, the 
consolidation of information, and the use of pictorial representations of systems 





1. Research Questions 
 Three research questions were proposed for examination in this thesis: (1) 
Did the CAU design changes lead to improvements in crew mental workload 
and/or situation awareness?; (2) If mental workload and/or situation awareness 
improvements exist, do they vary by crew station or phase of flight?; and (3) Can 
crew mental workload, and/or situation awareness changes be traced back to 
specific CAU design modifications? 
The first research question was answered definitively.  Highly significant 
improvements in MW and SA were found for every measure between the 
baseline and CAU designs.  Furthermore, the design critique identified several 
factors in the CAU design changes, including use of color, consolidation of 
information, and use of pictorial system representations that, according to the 
literature, should have resulted in reduced MW and increased SA.  It is therefore 
evident that the CAU design changes were behind the significant improvements 
that were identified. 
Answers to the second research question were found in the analyses of 
variance.  In particular, significantly greater improvements in MW and SA were 
found for ascent operations than for entry, and pilots were found to differ from the 
other crew positions in ascent trajectory SA improvements.  These results 
definitively support that the improvements in MW and varied measurably by both 
crew station and phase of flight. 
The third research question was answered by synthesizing the results of 
the statistical analysis with those of the design critique.  Overall improvements 
between baseline and CAU designs can be traced to the use of color, the 
consolidation of imagery, and the pictorial representation of systems. However, 




The difference in improvement between ascent and entry operations, 
however, points to the ascent H-SIT display. From a display design perspective, 
the development of this format is the most significant change that affects only 
ascent operations.  This determination is further supported by the observation 
that astronauts in the pilot position did not experience the same improvement as 
other astronauts in measures of trajectory SA.  Since the CAU H-SIT is outside 
the normal field of view from the pilot’s seat but within the normal field of view for 
commanders and mission specialists, it follows that pilots would not experience 
the same benefits as the other positions.   
2. Human Systems Integration Domain Applicability 
The study identified a connection between human interface design 
changes, and operator MW and SA.  This connection is directly relevant to the 
HFE domain.  The lessons learned from this evaluation are broadly applicable to 
future HFE design and evaluation activities. 
The design critique also identified changes in task requirements between 
the baseline and CAU designs.  The connection between changing task 
demands and operator performance has implications in the training domain.  This 
connection demands consideration of the effect of design on the knowledge, 
skills, and abilities that relate to the operation of the system.  
The review of the scientific literature identified a clear connection between 
operator MW and SA, and system safety (e.g., Wickens, 2004; Tsang & Vidulich, 
2006).  Consequently, the findings of this thesis that relate to MW and SA also 
represent a contribution to the HSI domain of Safety.  This design evaluation 
represents one way in which safety of future systems can be improved. 
3. Assessment Criteria 
MW and SA are central concepts within aerospace human factors 
research (Wickens, 2002).  Because of this, several measures of MW and SA 




using both BWRS and NASA-TLX instruments, and SA data were collected using 
both objective and subjective measures.  Of these, BWRS and Subjective SA 
measures proved to be the most beneficial to this evaluation.  For the SA 
measures, this decision was primarily based on the greater sampling of 
subjective data vs. objective data.  For the MW measures, however, TLX 
measures showed less internal consistency than BWRS measures, and included 
possible indications of scale reversal by the participants.  The BWRS, in 
comparison, appeared to be well understood by all participants. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Collectively, the results indicate that the use of color, consolidation of 
information, and use of pictures dramatically improve MW and SA.  These 
findings are consistent with the potential effects described in Wickens et al. 
(2004).  However, as the experiment was not designed distinguish between the 
effects of these individual changes, no conclusion can be reached about their 
relative contributions.  It is nonetheless clear that these design principles are 
highly effective when used together.   
The evidence does support a more specific conclusion regarding the 
ascent H-SIT display.  The difference in improvement between ascent and entry 
operations indicates that the predictive aiding provided by this display was 
particularly beneficial.  The observation that astronauts who could not see the 
display experienced less of an improvement in trajectory SA than those that 
could further supports this conclusion. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Future manned space systems would almost certainly benefit from 
incorporating the design principles demonstrated in the CAU.  The use of a 
consistent color scheme, task-centric consolidation of information, and the use of 
pictorial representations of complex systems are clear, positive factors in 




predictive aiding displays should be developed for use during all dynamic phases 
of flight.  Because of the ubiquity of the underlying principles, these 
recommendations can be further generalized to manned aircraft as well.   
In evaluating future systems, measurements of MW and SA should 
include the BWRS and Subjective SA.  Both of these instruments appeared to be 
well understood by participants and provided data that are both meaningful and 
internally consistent.  In addition, in future evaluations it would be of tremendous 
benefit to inquire of the participants what design features they felt had the 
greatest impact on overall improvement.  Short of designing an experiment that 
examines design features in isolation, this would be the most appropriate way to 
















APPENDIX A. EXAMPLES OF CAU BENEFITS 
Note: The material in this Appendix has been condensed and adapted 
from Evaluation of the Space Shuttle Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (CAU) Displays 
by J.W. McCandless, Revision G, dated 2004, unpublished. Used with 
permission. 
A. ELECTRICAL BUS FAILURE 
As an example illustrating the differences between the Baseline and CAU 
cockpits, this section discusses the process of diagnosing a failure of the Aft 
Power Controller (APC) #6, a component that provides power to a number of 
sensors, heaters, engine gimbals, valves, and other redundant systems.  This 
example demonstrates changes that primarily relate to internal, system SA.  This 
process is discussed for both Baseline and CAU displays. 
1. Baseline 
When the APC6 failure occurs, the first indicator is a set of BFS driven 
Fault Messages generated by the Caution and Warning System.  The crew 
member then views these fault messages on the "BFS FAULT" summary display 
(see Figure 38).  The first of the three messages, "MPS LH2/LO2 ULL" indicates 
a problem with the MPS.  The failure indicated is an effect of the loss of an MPS 
sensor. The crewmember must process several such indications of failures 






Figure 38.   Baseline BFS Fault Summary Display 
The crewmember has further insight to the MPS via the "BFS GNC SYS 
SUMM 1" display (Figure 39).  As a function of the APC 6 failure, the "R MPS 
ULL P LH2" and "LO2" values show 'off-nominal' values of "12.0" with an 
accompanying down arrow for "LH2" and zero ("0") for "LO2."  These numbers 
indicate how much pressure is available in the external propellant storage tanks 
to supply liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen to each main engine.  If the "LH2" 
pressure is too low, the engine will stop running from lack of fuel.  With no other 
confirming cues, this signature looks like an impending loss of pressurization in 
the External Tank (ET). 
The remaining fault messages, "THRM APU" and "APU SPD LO 2" refer 
to the APU system that provides hydraulic pressure to the shuttle.  "THRM APU" 
indicates an off nominal temperature reading for one of the APUs, and "APU 
SPD LO 2" indicates a low turbine speed reading for APU 2.  The "BFS SM SYS 
SUMM 2" display provides more specific information, showing that APU 2 has an 
off-scale low "SPEED" indicated by an "L,” and APU 3 has an off scale low "GG 






Figure 39.   Baseline BFS GNC Sys Summ 1 Display 
 
Figure 40.   Baseline BFS SM System Summary 2 Display 
Taken at face value, the signatures appear to imply the loss of 2 out of 3 
APUs.  However, in this instance the MPS and APU signatures are the result of 
instrumentation failures caused by the APC 6 failure. To determine the exact 




confirm that the SSMEs and APUs are actually running normally, and conclude 
that these indications are instrumentation failures.  The crewmember must then 
find the commonality between the sensors that failed simultaneously.  Given the 
multitude of electrical buses and sensors on the vehicle, this "root cause 
determination" is a difficult task. 
Inability to associate these signatures into a "root cause" of APC6 can 
have serious consequences.  A crewmember failing to identify the proper failure 
means that they have low situation awareness of the state of the vehicle, and the 
correct procedure and recovery actions are not taken.  This can lead to other 
equipment failures or problems later in the flight.  
2. CAU 
Looking at an APC6 failure in CAU cockpit, we find that the Fault 
Messages annunciated for the failure are very similar.  However, unlike the 
Baseline "BFS FAULT" summary display, the CAU "Fault Sum" display has a 
direct indication of a problem in the Electrical Power System (EPS) section (see 
Figure 41).  The red "c" in the lower right of the section labeled "EPS" indicates a 
sub-bus failure on the Main C electrical bus.  The "Fault Sum" also shows no 
indications of MPS or APU-related failures.  The red "c" directs the crewmember 






Figure 41.   CAU Fault Sum Display 
The "EPS Sum" display shows a layout of the shuttle's electrical bus 
system (see Figure 42).  The EPS is divided into three Main buses (A, B, and C) 
that each have a set of sub-buses.  APC6 is a sub-bus of Main C.  The "EPS 
Sum" display colors the APC6 box and interior label red, indicating that the APC6 
bus has failed.  By directing the crews' attention to the appropriate location on the 
display via color-coding, the source of the failure is immediately apparent, 
eliminating the need to perform time-consuming and difficult cognitive operations 
to determine the root cause of the failure.  Once the root cause is known, the 
crewmembers can reference their Flight Data File (FDF) to determine capabilities 
and redundancies lost throughout the cockpit and take the appropriate 
recovery/reconfiguration actions.  These losses are also displayed to the crew on 






Figure 42.   CAU EPS Summary Display 
If the crewmember looked at the "MPS Sum" display to see what the 
SSME impacts were to the APC6 failure, he or she would see that the Ullage 
pressure ("H2 Ull") value for the right engine has been replaced with the missing 
data symbol 'm' in cyan, indicating that the data is missing (see Figure 43).  
Since the APC6 failure removed power from this sensor, the CAU cockpit 
statuses the data as missing rather than showing invalid data as in the MEDS 
cockpit.  Additionally, the CAU display shows that Helium valve A on the Right 
SSME is failed to the closed portion by coloring it red.  This valve is one of two 
redundant valves on the R SSME that provides helium required for the engine to 
run.  This failure indication is very valuable in letting the crewmember know not to 
close the "B" valve at any time in the future while the engine is running.  
Otherwise, the engine would be starved of helium and immediately shutdown.  
An engine shutting down due to a loss of helium is a potentially catastrophic 
condition.  The "failed closed" status of the helium valve is not readily available in 






Figure 43.   CAU MPS Sum Display 
B. TRAJECTORY 
Another example illustrating the benefits of the CAU displays concept over 
the Baseline configuration focuses on the vehicle trajectory.  This example 
demonstrates changes that primarily relate to spatial/temporal SA.  This process 
is discussed for both Baseline and CAU displays. 
1. Baseline 
The "H-SIT" display contains an overhead picture of the relationship of the 
shuttle and the runway (see Figure 44).  In other words, it depicts what the 
shuttle and runway would look like if viewed from an altitude above the shuttle 
looking straight down. The shuttle symbol in the lower center of this section is in 
a fixed position on the display.  The three dots in front of the shuttle are a 
prediction of where the shuttle will be in 20, 40, and 60 seconds based on 




the line in it) represents the Heading Alignment Cone (HAC), and the direction of 
the runway.  The shuttle approaches the runway and makes a partial circle 
approach prior to lining up with the runway and landing.  The runway graphic in 
this display example shows the runway off to the left of the nose of the shuttle, 
and the shuttle banking left (the 3 dots arc to the left) to approach it. Noticeably 
absent from this display is any indication of whether the shuttle has enough 
"energy" to make the runway.  In other words, does the shuttle currently have 
enough speed and altitude to fly to the runway? 
 
 
Figure 44.   Baseline Horizontal Situation Display 
With Baseline displays, the only onboard approximation of this is to use 
range (R) and altitude (H) data from the ENTRY ALPHA cue card (see Figure 
45). Using this cue card along with knowledge of the current altitude from the 
displays, the crew can compare their current range to the expected nominal 
range on the cue card.  The crew notes their current (actual) altitude and range 
(indicated on the displays), then compares the range on the card for their given 
altitude with the actual range.  For example, if the displays show that the space 
shuttle altitude is 227K feet, the crew would look on the ENTRY ALPHA cue card 




the crew's actual range (shown on the displays) does not match the range on the 
card, the vehicle is either high or low energy.  To continue the preceding 
example, if the displays show the actual range is 1397 nautical miles, the crew 
would know they are in a high energy state.  However, the crew cannot 
determine whether the selected site is still achievable.  Additionally, the displays 
show the range to only the currently selected site (not alternate sites).  If energy 
to the selected site is in question, the crewmember must select alternate sites, 
and then evaluate the range and altitude 
 
 
Figure 45.   Entry Alpha Cue Card 
2. CAU 
The CAU version of the Entry H-SIT contains a similar horizontal situation 
representation of that of the Baseline version of the display (see Figure 46).  The 
shuttle symbol is placed at a fixed position on the display, and the magenta line 
connects the shuttle to the runway, which moves based on its horizontal 
relationship to the shuttle.  In the figure provided, the runway is currently off to 
the left of the shuttle nose.  This indicator also shows that the shuttle is banked to 
the left towards the site.  This gives the crew the awareness that they are moving 






Figure 46.   CAU Entry Horizontal Situation Display 
The CAU display also adds some key pieces of situation awareness that 
are not available on the Baseline displays.  The display provides an indication on 
when the shuttle will command a "roll reversal."  During the course of entry, the 
shuttle does not fly straight at the runway, but rather flies a series of left and right 
turns banking one way and then the other as it descends through the 
atmosphere.  While the shuttle is banked left, its flight path turns to the left and 
the runway moves off to the right of the display.  Eventually the shuttle has to 
reverse roll and bank to the right to avoid the runway moving too far off to the 
right to make a landing.  The two gray lines extending from the shuttle graphic 
(they look like a big "V") indicate at what point the shuttle will command a roll 
reversal.  In the example picture, the shuttle is banked to the left towards the site 
(the runway is moving to the right).  When the runway moves far enough to the 
right, the magenta line will cross the right line of the "V" and the either the 




turn back toward the runway.  A countdown timer to the next roll reversal is 
located at the bottom right of the display.  The display example indicates that 
there is more than two minutes to the next roll reversal.  As the vehicle gets 
closer, the timer will begin counting down from two minutes and begin flashing 
when the roll reversal commences.  Additionally, the display also provides digital 
readouts of the "ΔAz" (delta azimuth, called Del Az) which is the angle between 
the shuttle's current velocity vector and the vector to the landing site and range 
("Rng").  These two pieces of data were available in Baseline conditions on 
another display.  The range is also depicted in graphical form indicated by the 
"range rings."  In the above figure, the plot shows the shuttle approximately 2900 
nautical miles away from the site.   
When the crew is flying manually, the CAU display also gives the crew a 
flashing alert when a roll reversal is approaching.  When there is less than 10 
seconds to a roll reversal, a "Roll in <10s" alert/message is displayed in this 
section.  When a roll reversal needs to be commanded a "Reverse Roll" alert is 
displayed in its place.  These alerts help keep the crew aware and help avoid 
missing or drastically delaying a roll reversal when flying manually.  Not 
performing roll reversals promptly could potentially result in not achieving landing 
on a runway. 
The top-left portion of this display also contains information on the 
shuttle's current energy state.  This is a completely new set of information for the 
crew.  This section is comprised mainly of an "energy footprint.”  This footprint 
displays information on what runways are achievable for landing based on the 
current energy state (in a basic sense, current velocity, altitude and distance from 
the site).  The center region (looks like an upside down home plate) is the 
nominal energy region.  Runways that appear in this section are achievable using 
nominal guidance commands.  The regions outside of the nominal energy region 
are low energy regions.  The sites located in these areas of the footprint are 




out with special flying techniques that minimize the energy loss during the entry 
profile.  Sites that are in the nominal footprint are colored white, which is the 
nominal color.  Sites that are in the low energy footprint are colored yellow, which 
indicates that they are an off-nominal condition.  Sites that are outside of the 
nominal and low energy regions are colored red.  Red and yellow are the warning 
and caution colors, respectively.  In the example above, both "KSC" and "NKT" 
runways are available in the nominal energy footprint, and "YHZ" (colored yellow) 
is available through the low energy techniques.  The CAU display greatly 
simplifies this energy assessment process, allowing the crew to make quick and 
correct decisions on which runway to fly towards.  The logic used in the energy 
evaluation is much more precise than the cue card method, and allows the crew 
to assess up to three sites simultaneously. The remaining portions of the 
Baseline display were moved to other CAU navigation displays to fit in with the 
task oriented design concept. 
When the shuttle gets closer to the runway and enters the Terminal Area 
Energy Management (TAEM) phase of flight (below Mach 2.5 for a nominal 
entry), the CAU display tailors itself to flying in that regime.  The energy state 
footprint is no longer needed, and the runway representation is swapped to show 






APPENDIX B. CAU COLOR STANDARDS 
 The upgraded CAU display formats use color to enable the crew to 
differentiate between the various classes of information, especially during off-
nominal conditions. Colors were primarily chosen based on usability principles, 
but were subject to hardware limitations.  The color scheme used throughout the 
CAU display formats is presented in Table 21. 
 
Color Associated Elements 
Dark Blue Background 




White Nominal information 
Magenta Commanded messages which are critical for crew to read 
Light Green Display title, navigation elements, highlighting  
Red warning 
Yellow caution 
Orange Disagreement between primary and backup software 
Cyan Data unavailable 
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